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Abstract
This essay, published in a symposium on the work of Adolf Berle,
approaches the Berle-Dodd debate from the perspective that corporate managers have responsibilities beyond pursuing the interests
of shareholders. Stock based executive compensation, designed to
align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, has, in the
investment banking industry in particular, failed to avert, and may
have caused, managers (in this case, bankers) to take excessive
risks that in the present financial crisis inflicted great damage on
creditors and on society as a whole. We describe here the broad
outlines of a proposal that we will discuss in future publications in
more detail to impose some measure of personal liability for a
bank’s debts on the most highly paid bankers. The proposal would
revive two mechanisms that imposed such personal liability in an
earlier era: general partnership, which was common for investment banks prior to the 1980s, and assessable stock, which was
relatively common in corporations (including some commercial
banks) through the 1930s. One proposal is that bankers earning
over $3 million per year be required to enter into a partnership/joint venture agreement with the employing bank that would
make them personally liable for some of the bank’s debts. The
other proposal is that compensation in excess of $1 million per
year be paid to bankers only in stock that is assessable in the event
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of the bank’s insolvency in an amount equal to the book value of
the stock on the date of issue. In either case, the bankers’ liability
would not be unlimited: they would be allowed to shield $1 million
from creditors. Imposing genuine downside risk through these or
other vehicles for personal liability may be the best way to make
bankers approach risk in a manner that reflects the potential for
externalities of the sort the crisis has so dramatically demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
For close to eighty years, the debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd has been a linchpin for discussion of the principal duties of
corporate officers and directors. As pointed out in other papers published in this symposium issue, Berle did not repudiate Dodd’s argument
that officers and directors have obligations to creditors, employees, and
society as a whole. While he did argue for legal rules that would reinforce officers’ and directors’ duties to shareholders, his arguments were
based on practical necessity. Making officers and directors responsible
principally to shareholders was better than allowing them to continue to
be responsible to nobody at all.
Berle’s arguments were perhaps easy to mischaracterize as something they were not: broad philosophical statements about corporate purpose. As the 1930s and the Depression wore on, Berle and Dodd both
recognized the broad social implications of managerial misconduct that
had occurred in the 1920s.1 With banks failing and unemployment lines
growing longer, the public also recognized that these social implications
extended well beyond the losses suffered by shareholders. It was clear
then, as it is clear in today’s financial crisis, that shareholder (and even
creditor) losses are only a small part of the damage done.
Much has been written about the causes of the present crisis, how
future crises might be prevented, and how the damage from any crisis
might be limited. There has been some focus on compensation packages
of the bankers (a term we use generically in this essay to refer to highlycompensated employees in banks) whose decisions effectively caused the

1. Berle’s best-known book, written together with Gardiner Means is The Modern Corporation
and Private Property (1932). For a thoughtful analysis of Berle’s work, see William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the ‘Modern
Corporation,’ 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). Dodd’s perspective on the social responsibility of corporate
managers is set forth in E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). For Dodd’s perspective on these problems toward the end of the Great
Depression, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Modern Corporation: Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941).
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crisis.2 But what has been criticized is the bankers’ upside -- the amount
of money executives received if their firms did well. For reasons discussed below, we think that restricting upside is not enough. Bankers
should be exposed to some downside risk as well, preferably in the form
of some personal liability if their firms fail.
In this essay, we argue that bankers should be subject to some form
of personal liability. We propose two possible approaches: a mandatory
partnership/joint venture agreement and assessable stock. We sketch out
these proposals in general terms, leaving a full exposition to future publications. Part II provides some background on the historical aspects of
investment and commercial banks. Parts III through V address the theoretical underpinnings for our proposals. We describe our proposals in
Part VI. We then consider and respond to some objections to our proposals in Part VII. Part VIII concludes.
II. (SOME) HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Investment and commercial banks historically used arrangements
that at least tried to tie financial interests of bankers at senior levels to the
fate of creditors, including customers and depositors. One notable arrangement, used particularly before the 1930s, was assessable stock—
stock that, as we explain in more detail below, may require the holder to
pay amounts in addition to any amount he initially paid for the stock.3
Some commercial banks, as well as some other corporations, issued assessable stock to their directors and officers. When banks failed after the
1929 crash, state bank regulators and other receivers sought funds by
making assessments on the assessable stock. Stockholders challenged
the assessments, raising constitutional and statutory interpretation issues,
but courts often upheld the assessments.4 For example, in Broderick v.
Rosner,5 an opinion written by Justice Brandeis,6 the Supreme Court held

2. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J.
247 (2010); Fred Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk
Regulation, Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 10-93, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546229.
3. Assessable stock is “[a] class of stock in which the issuing company is allowed to impose
levies on stockholders for more funds.”
Investopedia Definition of Assessable Stock,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/assessablestock.asp (last visited April 11, 2010); see also
AllBusiness Definition of Assessable Stock, http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/assessablecapital-stock/4942955-1.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
4. For general commentary on relevant case law, see Harvard Law Review, Constitutional
Law—Impairment of the Obligation of Contracts—Assessment to Restore Impaired Capital, 45
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1932).
5. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
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that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, the New York Superintendent of Banks could bring suit for assessments against New Jersey residents holding stock in a New York bank.
The Court held that the defendants could not avail themselves of a New
Jersey statute prohibiting the initiation in New Jersey of suits brought
under the laws of another state to enforce stockholders’ personal liability.7 The Court, Justice Brandeis observed, would not allow the New Jersey defendants to escape their voluntarily assumed statutory obligation:
In respect to the determination of liability for an assessment, the
New Jersey stockholders submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
New York. For ‘the act of becoming a member (of a corporation) is
something more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and
abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicile, membership
looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting the
incorporation.’ . . . Obviously recognition could not be accorded to
a local policy of New Jersey, if there really were one, of enabling all
residents of the State to escape from the performance of a voluntarily assumed statutory obligation, consistent with morality, to contribute to the payment of the depositors of a bank of another State of
which they were stockholders.8

6. Justice Louis Brandeis was ideally suited to write this opinion on assessable stock in a banking corporation. His book OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) was
widely read, particularly by New Dealers in the Roosevelt Administration.
7. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629. Justice Brandeis’s opinion opened with a description of the relevant
statute:
Pursuant to article 8, s 7, of the Constitution of New York, its Banking Law (Consol.
Laws, c. 2) provides, section 120: ‘The stockholders of every bank will be individually
responsible, equally and ratably and not one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements of the bank, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value
thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares.’ Id. at 637.
Justice Brandeis then described the procedure used in this instance against the New Jersey defendants and upheld by the Supreme Court:
[O]n December 11, 1930, Broderick pursuant to section 57 of the New York Banking
Law, took possession of the Bank’s business and property; that since May 6, 1931, he has
been engaged in liquidating the same; that prior to July 1, 1932, he determined, pursuant
to sections 80 and 120, that the reasonable value of the assets of the Bank was not sufficient to pay the creditors in full and that there was due them $30,000,000 in excess of
such reasonable value; that the deficiency then fixed and determined has continued ever
since; that upon the Superintendent of Banks is imposed the duty of making assessment
upon the stockholders and enforcing the liability of stockholders for the benefit of the
creditors and that actions to enforce the liability are to be brought in the name of the Superintendent; that prior to July 1, 1932, he determined that an assessment of $25 against
each stockholder for each share of stock held by him was required for the payment of the
Bank’s indebtedness; that he duly made upon each stockholder a demand for the payment
thereof on August 8, 1932; and that among the stockholders upon whom such demand
was made and who failed to pay are the several defendants. Id. at 641 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 643–44 (citation omitted).
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Stock ownership was thus a lot more than a simple contract; it was a relationship that involved legal and moral obligations to the corporation’s
creditors. As the New York statute demonstrates, these obligations were
particularly strong when the corporation was a bank. In this era, before
extensive federal regulation of banks, the state where a bank was chartered had the primary responsibility for defining the terms of that relationship.
However, without adequate federal government oversight of banks,
state-mandated shareholder assessments proved inadequate to control
banks’ excessive risk taking. After the 1930s, the federal government
forced the commercial banks out of the stock market and other aspects of
investment banking in the Glass-Steagall Act, guaranteed commercial
bank deposits, and regulated commercial banks for safety and soundness.
In this post-Depression world, assessable stock was presumably no longer necessary because the government would tell the commercial banks
how to manage their affairs and bail out depositors when banks failed.
Investment banks, on the other hand, were not regulated for safety
and soundness. Indeed, these banks were subject to relatively little government oversight other than the customer protection regime imposed on
broker-dealers by the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.9 But there may
have been little need for such oversight. Until the 1980s, most investment banks were general partnerships run by partners who were personally liable for the debts of their firms.10 A partner of Lehman Brothers
did not want or need the government to tell him how to run his business;
if the business failed, the partner paid. Firms that did not exercise restraint failed in the next market downturn and they took their improvident partners with them.
All of this began to change in the 1970s. In 1970, the New York
Stock Exchange changed its rules to allow brokerage firms to have a
public float, a change arguably motivated by the need for outside capital.11 Most brokerage firms ceased being partnerships in which owners
are unlimitedly liable; they became corporations, offering owners limited
liability up to the amount of an investor’s investment. The people who
had been partners at these firms, and had had unlimited liability, became
managing directors of the successor corporations, with no liability for
their firms’ obligations—a fact little discussed at the time. During the
1970s and 1980s, most of the major Wall Street firms switched from
9. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1934) (Registration and Regulation of
Brokers and Dealers).
10. See generally ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILLHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING 276–
284 (2007)
11. Id. at 278–79 (discussing the impact of the NYSE rule change).
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partnership form to corporate form; the last holdout, Goldman Sachs, did
much of its business through limited liability entities until it also abandoned partnership form in 1999.12
On the commercial banking side, government oversight gradually
loosened, particularly when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed much
of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.13 Commercial bank holding companies, if not the banks themselves, could now carry a considerable amount
of risk on their balance sheets. Commercial banking and investment
banking also became more difficult to distinguish. This was true not only as to the businesses they conducted. It was also true as to how they
compensated their managers -- mostly in stock and stock options. The
now-familiar rationale was that the more stock the managers owned, the
more faithful they presumably would be to their companies’ shareholders. The emphasis on stock-based compensation reflected that in many
influential quarters, shareholder primacy had become the norm.14 To
overstate the case (but not by much), many believed that making managers shareholders would solve everything.15 Thus, one of the problems
that Berle identified—that managers too often do not do what stockholders want them to do—was supposedly solved, with enormous, some
would say grotesque, stock compensation plans. The broader problem
that Berle, Dodd and Brandeis had discussed—that corporations and particularly banks were sometimes run in a socially irresponsible manner—
was largely ignored.16
III. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Until 2008. We will not discuss in detail what led up to the present
financial crisis; we will only state the obvious. Banks took excessive
risks—risks that were not commensurate with the associated potential
rewards. The government bailed out some of the banks at enormous cost
to taxpayers. The creditors who were not bailed out suffered huge losses.
Bank employees lost their jobs. The world went into the deepest economic downturn since the 1930s. People lost their homes.
12. See id. (discussing the changeover from partnerships to corporations by most Wall Street
firms).
13. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
14. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
15. If managers hold significant shareholdings, their interests will therefore be at least somewhat aligned with those of shareholders. There are many articulations of this classic and common
sense view. One such articulation, in a court case, is In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731
A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), in which the court noted that directors with significant shareholdings in
Disney would not be motivated to vote for a too-high compensation package.
16. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2 (citing publications of Berle and Dodd); see also
Morrison & Willhelm, supra note 10 (citing LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW
THE BANKERS USE IT (1914)).
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The bankers whose risk-taking precipitated this crisis saw the value
of their stocks and options in their companies fall dramatically. But they
kept the money they had earned in previous investment banking jobs
where they probably took similar risks. They kept the amounts they had
earned on their present job that had been paid in cash; they also kept the
amounts paid in stock that they had managed to turn into cash before the
crash. 17 If they were particularly lucky, they had already left their banks
for a government job regulating banks, and had been forced by government ethics lawyers to sell their bank stock at the high prices that prevailed before 2008—with an Office of Government Ethics certificate of
divestiture thrown in so capital gains tax would be deferred.18 They kept
whatever family money they had. They kept their homes, their cars, their
jets and everything else not tied to bank stock or stock options. Some of
these bankers lost an extraordinary amount of money, others less. They
almost all, however, had a lot left over.
IV. FROM PARTNERSHIP TO LIAR’S POKER AND WORSE
How did this happen? As we mentioned earlier, investment banks
used to be partnerships; the “managers” were partners, unlimitedly liable
for obligations of their banks. If the banks failed they would not have
much of anything left over. In what follows, we trace in a bit more detail
the trajectory by which investment banks became corporations and bankers became “managers” with limited liability shields.
In earlier years, investment banking partnerships were managed by
partners. Partners face a real downside if their business fails. They are
personally liable for the debts of their partnership; they can lose their
savings, their houses, and just about everything else. In investment
banking partnerships, it often took many years for someone to become a
partner because the other partners had to be willing to risk everything on
the new partner. Because they bore the collective responsibility of paying creditors, they were collectively involved in risk taking over certain
dollar amounts, sometimes huddling together on their trading floor to
discuss a big trade. In contrast, commercial banks were organized as
limited liability entities. Their managers thus did not have the same constraints investment bankers had on risk-taking; what did constrain their
risk-taking was government regulation.
17. Indeed, some managers cashed out and salvaged considerable wealth. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming summer 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513522.
18. See Certificates of Divesture–General Rule, 5 CFR § 2634.1004 (2004) (used for deferral
of capital gains tax on assets sold by government official to avoid conflict of interest).
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Salomon Brothers provides a good example of risk-taking informed
and constrained by the potential for unlimited liability. Salomon Brothers took calculated risks. It specialized in bonds, and developed its business with the expansion in government and corporate bond offerings in
the years after the Great Depression.19 The firm conducted high-quality
bond market research, although most of this research focused on predicting interest rates and analyzing the yield curve (the relationship between
the interest earned on a bond and its maturity).20 Like the rest of Wall
Street, Salomon relied on the major rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, to analyze borrower credit worthiness.21 In an era before credit default swaps and other recent innovations in debt markets,
Salomon’s bond business was considered to be one of the most boring
parts of an investment banking business that was itself relatively boring.
The firm’s partners appreciated the lack of excitement: as young men,
during the Depression, they had seen too much “excitement” in their financial affairs. In the 1960s, when Salomon became one of Wall Street’s
biggest firms, it was run by William Salomon and other senior partners.22
This generation of bankers knew what it was like to have a banking partnership fail and be stuck personally paying firm creditors.23
19. For a brief history of Salomon Brothers, see http://www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/Salomon-Inc-Company-History.html. For further history, see CHARLES D. ELLIS & AND
JAMES R. VERTIN, WALL STREET PEOPLE: TRUE STORIES OF TODAY’S MASTERS AND MOGULS 303–
08 (Wiley 2001).
20. Id. A Salomon researcher could likely provide information regarding the yield on a debt
instrument in ancient Mesopotamia. See SIDNEY HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (Rutgers
University Press 1963) (tracing interest rates back to the year 2000 B.C.). Martin Leibowitz brought
the mathematical modeling of the yield curve to Solomon. See SIDNEY HOMER & MARTIN L.
LEIBOWITZ, INSIDE THE YIELD BOOK: NEW TOOLS FOR BOND MARKET STRATEGY (Prentice Hall &
the New York Institute of Finance 1972). Henry Kaufman became Salomon’s chief economist and
earned his reputation as “Dr. Doom” when he consistently, and usually correctly, predicted that
interest rates were headed up. Salomon researchers even continued to work together after they had
left the firm. See SIDNEY HOMER & MARTIN L. LEIBOWITZ, INSIDE THE YIELD BOOK: THE CLASSIC
THAT CREATED THE SCIENCE OF BOND ANALYSIS (Bloomberg Press 2004) (this more recent edition
includes a foreword by Henry Kaufman and two new sections by Martin Leibowitz).
21. Analysis of borrower creditworthiness was for the most part outsourced to the rating agencies; (issuer-specific research for equity securities, by contrast, has traditionally been done by inhouse analysts at most major Wall Street firms. This reliance on rating agencies apparently worked
for several decades. However, by the 1980s, Salomon was a corporation, and would become a key
player in the development of exotic debt instruments that made borrower creditworthiness increasingly difficult to analyze. Would the earlier generation of bond market researchers have recognized
that reliance on the credit rating agencies was increasingly problematic? Maybe less-than-ideallycareful investment bankers could not recognize less-than-ideally-careful (and, some argue, conflicted) rating agencies. For discussion of the problems rating agencies had in rating the securities
involved in the crisis, see Claire A. Hill, Why Did the Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job With
Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010).
22. See supra note 19.
23. We should disclose that Sidney Homer, a partner of Salomon Brothers and head of its bond
market research department until 1972, was Mr. Painter’s grandfather. Earlier, Mr. Homer had
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Salomon’s capital belonged to the partners; there were no shareholders. The money partners invested was their own, and they had to
leave as much of it as possible in the firm so the firm could grow. Large
cash distributions to the firm’s partners were not an option; raising capital from outside investors or borrowing funds simply was not feasible.
Partnership tax rules made the cash flow situation even more challenging: partners paid taxes on the firm’s profits whether or not the profits
were distributed to them.24 Between the tax demands of the government
and the capital requirements of the firm, investment banking partners had
to lead relatively modest lives. When they retired, partners usually had a
significant amount of money in the firm, but it was paid out slowly over
several years because the firm still needed the capital.25
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, many of these investment banks
switched from partnership form to corporate form; with corporate form,
the banks could access huge amounts of capital from stockholders and
other investors.26 For the investment bankers who ran these firms, the
switch also brought important new developments: liquidity for the money they had locked up in their firms;27 a compensation system based on
bonuses, stock, and stock options instead of slow but steady accrual of
partnership capital within the firm; and, most significant to our analysis
here, no personal liability for the debts of the firm. Each firm had its
own trajectory, but the impact on investment bankers’ behavior seemed
uniform. Wall Street changed in the 1980s, from a fairly staid place to

started his own bond firm, Homer & Co., which survived the Great Depression. When the United
States entered World War II, Mr. Homer went to Washington to help Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau track down Nazi bank accounts. Homer & Co. was left in the hands of a partner and
soon thereafter found itself stuck with a large inventory of bonds in a bear market. The firm failed.
Mr. Homer returned to New York, took a salaried job as a researcher at another firm, and spent
much of the next decade paying Homer & Co. creditors. He became a partner of Salomon Brothers
in 1961. ELLIS & VERTIN, supra note 19, at 303–305.
24. Top federal income tax brackets have fluctuated but have been as high as 94% during
World War II and 70% throughout the 1970's. These rates were lowered significantly in 1981. For
historical information on tax rates from 1913 to 2002, see http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/02inpetr.pdf.
25. The partners’ and retired partners’ capital was often the only capital the firm had. Investment bankers in those days could live in nice homes and put food on the table; they even rode in
limousines to work and probably spent too much of their money on cigars. They did not, however,
live the lavish lifestyles that many investment bankers live today. With the cigars mostly gone, Wall
Street investment bankers’ bodies are probably healthier—but, as the crisis has made clear, their
firms are not.
26. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The New York Stock Exchange rules once
prohibited brokerage firms from being publicly held, but this rule was changed in 1970. Id.
27. Michael Bloomberg was one of the Salomon Brothers partners who withdrew money from
the firm in 1981, the year he also left the firm. He used the money to start his electronic financial
information service that eventually made him billions. See http://ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/111/B
loomberg-L-P-EARLY-HISTORY.html
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one where frenetic risk-taking became the norm.28 Limited liability, and
the moral hazard that comes with it, is an important reason for the
change.
Again, Salomon Brothers provides an example. It switched from
partnership form to corporate form in 1981 when it merged with Phibro
Commodities.29 After the switch, traders now traded with other people’s
money, not with their own or their partners’ money. Their personal assets outside of the firm were not at risk. The age of Liar’s Poker had begun.30 Michael Lewis’s description in this book, published in 1989, of
the term used for a star trader—a “Big Swinging Dick”—reflected not
only the rise of obscenity on trading floors, but also an ethos in which
investment bankers engaged in risky conduct and were no longer personally responsible for their actions. Senior management steered the firm
into junk bonds, and several top executives, including economist Henry
Kaufman, quit in protest. A scandal involving a rogue trader in the 1990s
was disastrously handled by senior management31 until shareholder
Warren Buffet (one of the few shareholders in America who does not
have to worry about the Berle-Means problem) intervened and fired top
management.32 By the late 1990s, the firm’s name had lost its luster and
what remained of Salomon’s investment banking business was, along
with Phibro, merged into Sandy Weill’s financial empire at Citicorp.33
Citicorp could run the business as it pleased, with relatively little federal
oversight: the commercial bank Citibank was kept separate. One more
28. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 19.
30. MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL STREET
(Penguin Books 1990). Lewis’s account begins when he was hired by Salomon in 1984 and the
training class he participated in shortly thereafter. By the time Lewis joined the firm, Salomon had
only been a corporation for three years; however, from his account, it appears the culture had already
changed.
31. For a discussion of this scandal, see Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer
Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 101 (1996).
32. For discussion of Warren Buffett’s role at Salomon, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, BUFFETT:
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CAPITALIST (Main Street Books 1996). For a discussion of the role
of the General Counsel in the treasury bid scandal at Salomon, see Painter & Duggan, supra note 31.
Nobody, including Salomon’s General Counsel Don Fauerstein, reported the rogue trader’s misconduct to the Board of Directors, even though senior management would not do anything about it.
Warren Buffett, as a member of the Board and a major investor, was understandably upset. The
firm’s reputation, built up over many years by its partners and employees, was ruined in a few
months. The Salomon incident and other similar incidents led to proposals (eventually enacted in
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) to require corporate lawyers to address this aspect
of the separation of ownership from control by reporting known illegal acts to client boards of directors.
33. Neil Bennett, City: King Salomon’s Mine! Sandy Weill, Head of Travelers, Has Snapped
up Wall Street’s Most Famous Brokerage House for $9bn. Neil Bennett Reveals How the Deal Was
Done and Why Weill Moved in Where Others Have Walked Away, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
LONDON, Sept. 28, 1997.
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detail contributed to the impending disaster: the Glass-Steagall Act was
repealed.34 The Act had prohibited commercial banks from getting into
investment banking; it was repealed thanks to pressure from banks—
pressure that was legitimized by the then-enormous faith in markets and
market actors.35
This history suggests that when investment banks became corporations, they changed dramatically from what they had been as partnerships. It is as corporations, with their new-found corporate ethos, that
they engaged in the behavior that arguably caused the financial crisis.
Corporations, of course, must act through individuals. Our next section
discusses why a corporate manager might take excessive risks even if he
has a significant financial stake in the corporation—risks that he probably would not have taken had he been a partner in a partnership.
V. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LIMITED LIABILITY
Imagine a casino that you can enter with no money and no chips.
You are given chips when you enter the casino, and the more time you
spend in the casino, the more chips you are given. You are supposed to
gamble with your own chips and the chips of other people outside the
casino called “investors” or “customers.” If you bet and win, you get to
keep all of your own winnings and some of the winnings from the people
you gamble for. If you win big, the casino gives you more chips as a
bonus. You know, however, that you can be kicked out of the casino if
you talk too much about excessive risk-taking by other gamblers in the
casino or suggest that it might be provident for the government to regulate the casino. At any time, you can leave the casino, cash in your
chips, bank the money, and move on to another casino that will let you
play by the same rules with new chips. If you lose, the most you can lose
is all of your chips and money of the people you were gambling for.
Whatever property you had before you entered the casino is still yours.
If you are lucky, you will cash in your chips before things get really bad.
34. See supra note 13.
35. Some subsequent history is of interest. Phibro’s business turned out to be extremely risky
and its compensation arrangements with its top executive, Andrew Hall, turned out to be extremely
generous: a year after Citibank had gotten billions of federal bailout dollars, it was supposed to pay
Hall over $100 million. This led Citicorp to rethink limited liability, albeit under pressure from the
federal government. Citicorp was apparently considering spinning off Phibro as a general partnership with Mr. Hall as a managing partner. Eric Dash, Citigroup Considers Changes at Phibro, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at B1 (“Citigroup executives are considering what to do next. One option
would be to transform Phibro into a partnership headed by Mr. Hall.”). Citicorp ended up solving
the problem in a different way: by selling Phibro, along with Mr. Hall’s bonus problem, to Occidental Petroleum. See David Enrich, Ben Casselman & Deborah Solomon, How Occidental Scored Citi
Unit Cheaply: Bailout, Andrew Hall Factor Hurt Bank’s Bargaining Position; ‘Why Should I Pay a
Premium?’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2009, at A28.
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Even if things get really bad, you might have enough influence in Washington to get the government to bail you out by giving you more chips.
Before the 2008 crisis, banking in the post-partnership era was
much the same. Many people have argued that the structure of manager
compensation contributed significantly to the crisis: managers got huge
bonuses based on short term results. These commentators have argued
that giving managers more of their compensation in the form of longterm stock options, or stock to be held long term, might be an important
solution.36 This suggestion accords with common sense: one might think
huge equity stakes would suffice to make bankers proceed very cautiously before incurring huge risks, especially risks that the bankers (at least
many of them) are now plausibly claiming they did not understand. How
could any banker not think long and hard—longer and harder, apparently, than bankers did think—about the real possibility of losing a great
deal of their own money, perhaps amounting to hundreds of millions of
dollars? The casino analogy above suggests an answer; in what follows,
we elaborate and offer various complementary explanations.
Various terms and frameworks in psychology are available to describe the effects at issue: these include “prospect theory,”37 and more
specifically, the “house money effect.” The “house money effect” is a
term coined by Richard Thaler.38 The intuition is straightforward, and he
and others have found evidence to support it.39 A prior gain may be experienced as “house money”—people may be far more willing to make a
risky bet with house money than they would with what they might regard
as their own money. We share this intuition, and find this dynamic and
others like it helpful in explaining why managers took the risks they
took. A contrast with a more traditional economic view about risk is instructive. Such a view is hard pressed to understand excessive risk taking of the sort that occurred in the crisis. Paradigmatically, it looks at
36. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009).
37. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky originally developed prospect theory in 1979. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Prospect theory’s key elements are: “(1) a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains, and (2) a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale, which overweights small probabilities and underweights moderate
and high probabilities.” Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representations of Uncertainty, in CHOICE, VALUES, AND FRAMES 44, 44 (Kahneman &
Tverksy eds., Cambridge University Press 2000).
38. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1994). The term first
appears in a paper by Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and
Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Lucy F. Ackert, Narat Charupat, Bryan K. Church & Richard Deaves, An Experimental Examination of the House Money Effect in a Multi-Period Setting (FRB of Atlanta Working
Paper No. 2003-13, 2003).
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absolutes: a computation of the expected gains and losses of a particular
gamble. The more nuanced view we advance takes into account many
other things, including a reference point above or below which a particular outcome would be experienced as a gain (or loss).
More orthodox dynamics may also be at issue, such as the declining
marginal utility of money. Beyond a certain point, money for the sake of
its purchasing power may not matter much. Thus, bankers may not have
minded the prospect of huge losses: despite those losses, many of them
are left over with more money than they can reasonably spend on themselves and their families. 40 Moreover, a person may also get enormous
utility out of “being in the game”—his identity as a “player” 41 or his acceptance into an elite circle of high rollers may yield significant payoffs.
He may also get payoffs in the form of professional and social advancement. He may be motivated, too, by fear of acquiring a reputation for
being a “retrograde” banker stuck in “luddite” modes of investing, not
savvy enough to recognize and appreciate new investment strategies. In
a business world obsessed with stock price, institutional shareholders and
stock analysts may shun bankers who acquire a reputation for conservatism in favor of those who are willing to take big risks in highly leveraged
firms; indeed, shareholders generally should benefit from risks taken
with creditors’ money. .
This same risk-prone banker, however, might have a different attitude if faced with the prospect of having very few personal assets left
over because he took a bad risk. For a banker assured of always having a
certain amount of money, the loss of some money, even a considerable
amount, may not matter much. In contrast, for a banker faced with the
prospect of having less than a certain amount of money, the loss of more
money may matter a lot. The curve is not linear. In other words, what
may matter more to a banker than the absolute amount of money he has
“in the game” (that is, the amount he can lose) is his position in a worstcase scenario. The possibility of a loss of $950 million of a $1 billion
portfolio, having $50 million left over, may matter less than the possibility of a loss of all but $1 million of just about any large portfolio.
We do not need to hypothesize an elaborate reason, whether “rational” or “irrational,” for the bankers to have taken the risks they did.
Perhaps they simply were not up to the task of assessing risks properly,
40. Another possibility is that the banker may be a hyperbolic discounter, preferring to ride
high in the short term, notwithstanding that he may later have to pay the piper For a discussion of
hyperbolic discounting, see generally David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q. J. ECON. 443 (1997).
41. For further discussion about identity payoffs of this sort, see Claire A. Hill, The Law and
Economics of Identity, 32 QUEENS L. J. 389 (2007).
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or were just over-optimistic. Regardless of the explanation, it seems evident from the latest crisis that bankers are willing to take big risks, even
when they stand to lose significant amounts themselves, if they are likely
to have a significant amount of assets left over. Risk-preferring behavior
can be more effectively reduced by focusing on what a banker would
have left over after his firm’s risky gamble failed, rather than the amount
he personally lost in the gamble.
We should make an additional point: for whatever reason, the
process by which “natural selection” chooses the people who rise to the
top in banking has, in recent years, favored bankers who are willing to
take big risks with the banks they work for, whether or not they have
enormous exposure of their own stock holdings to downside risk.42 Asking how hypothetical “rational” wealth-maximizing bankers who have
significant equity interests in their banks would approach risk may be the
wrong question. The right question may be: What types of people are
likely to be senior managers (and large equity holders) of banks, responsible for making decisions about risks the banks will incur? We may
also want to ask what, other than the ineffective approach of throwing
yet more stock at these bankers, can be done to recalibrate attitudes toward risk and bring them closer in line with the more conservative expectations of society after the 2008 debacle? We now turn to this question.
VI. IMPOSING (SOME) PERSONAL LIABILITY ON BANKERS
Much discussion about the present financial crisis has addressed the
role of bankers’ compensation in precipitating the crisis.43 However, the
principal focus has been on bankers’ short time horizons. Bankers receive bonuses at year-end, based supposedly on results they or their
banks have achieved during the year; these bonuses are much larger than
a banker’s yearly salary. Moreover, as part of their compensation, bankers typically get stock options; these options are also believed to shorten
bankers’ time horizons. Shorter time horizons motivate risk-taking, encouraging bankers to seek year-end results that may not be lasting or may
simply be a mirage. Thus, long-term stock holdings are touted as an alternative to bonuses and stock options. More careful monitoring of compensation also has been proposed, as have restrictions on compensation
for excessive risk-taking and “say on pay,” shareholder advisory votes on
42. For a discussion of psychological traits of people who become CEOs, see generally Donald
C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285
(2004).
43. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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executive compensation. Scholars and other commentators have been
active participants in the debate, as has the Obama administration.44 The
agency problem, in which bankers prefer their own interests rather than
the interests of those they are supposed to be working for, presumably
would be minimized through compensation schemes that would better
align bankers’ interests with those of the shareholders.
In our view, although it is appropriate to focus on lengthening
bankers’ time horizons and aligning their interests with those of their
shareholders, these measures are far from sufficient to curtail excessive
risk taking. Many bankers had enormous equity stakes in their companies and nevertheless took big risks. Indeed, their shareholders may have
wanted them to do so (although probably not ex post). Shareholders can
lose their investment in a company, but cannot lose more; they get significant upside benefit from risk and bear only part of the downside cost.
The rest of the cost has been borne by other actors, including, prominently, taxpayers. And the cost has been enormous.

We argued above that when banks became corporations, they
began behaving in a far riskier manner than they had when they
were partnerships, and that this increment of extra risk was a significant cause of the crisis. What if we could turn back the clock?
Clearly, we cannot do so altogether: general partnership, with the illiquidity and liability it imposes on general partners and the constraints it imposes on a bank’s ability to raise capital, probably will
not be considered a viable option.45 But perhaps we can go part of the
way, imposing a form of personal liability for bankers. How would we
achieve this? Our objective is to design a way to impose some of the
risks of personal liability on the most highly compensated bankers at investment banks and other financial services and trading firms. We seek
to do so without requiring the firm itself to switch to general partnership
form or to make any other change in its organizational structure. We
discuss below two approaches, which could be adopted individually, alternatively, or in tandem with one another. Both would impose on bank44. See Tung, supra note 2, and Romano, supra note 36. For a discussion of attempts to restrict executive compensation more broadly, see Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 368–
71 (2009).
45. It should be noted that some investment banks, including Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, have put themselves under commercial bank holding company structures for the time being
in order to get access to credit from the Federal Reserve. When the Federal Reserve money is no
longer needed, however, these banks will probably want to liberate themselves from federal commercial bank regulations by switching back to the investment banking model they used before.
Many other investment banks have remained investment banks. It is uncertain what federal regulation will be imposed on the safety and soundness of investment banks in response to the present
crisis.
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ers the obligation to potentially pay some amounts from their own assets
to pay their firms’ debts. Our discussion is not intended to be comprehensive; our aim here is to sketch out the approaches, leaving the details
to future publications.
The first approach is a mandatory partnership/joint venture agreement between certain companies (as defined further below, “Covered
Companies”) and certain highly compensated bankers (as defined further
below, “Covered Employees”) earning over $3 million per year in compensation. Covered Employees would have exposure to personal liability, just as investment bankers who were partners not so long ago had
such exposure. The second approach requires that Covered Companies
pay any employee whose compensation exceeds $1 million in any year
the excess over $1 million in assessable stock. In the event of firm insolvency, the stock would be assessable in an amount equal to its fair
market value at the time of issuance. The assessment would be a personal debt of the record holder of the stock just as it was in the 1930s for the
unfortunate holder of assessable stock in a commercial bank that failed.
Other commentators have suggested measures that could change the
behavior of bankers by making them think harder about the position of
creditors or of their own personal liability for mismanagement. Some of
these proposals would affect compensation, while others involve enhanced personal liability for demonstrated wrongdoing. For example,
Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann have proposed that bankers’ compensation be tied to the performance of the bank’s debt securities, not
just its stock.46 Even before the 2008 crisis, Don Langevoort proposed
making it easier to impose personal liability on corporate executives for
securities fraud.47 Lyman Johnson has proposed not allowing corporate
officers to avail themselves of the protection of the business judgment
rule; the rule, he argues, is appropriate only for outside directors.48
These proposals are headed in the right direction, but we are concerned that they may not go far enough. The Bebchuk-Spamann compensation proposal is better than prevailing practices linking compensation principally to reported earnings and stock performance, but it still
involves no risk of loss for bankers—only forgone gains—if creditors do
poorly. The Langevoort and Johnson proposals make it easier to show
management wrongdoing and to impose personal liability, but still turn
46. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2.
47. See Donald Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives Naked, Homeless and Without
Wheels: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007).
48. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW.
865 (2005).
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upon a showing of wrongdoing. The uncertainties and transaction costs
of any fault-based legal system will limit its influence on executives’
behavior. Realistically, the best we can hope for is modest change for
the better. What we will certainly get, whether or not executive behavior
changes for the better, is more litigation and more excuses made by executives in the course of defending themselves in litigation.
More importantly, none of these proposals go as far as our proposals do in approaching banking as the type of socially useful yet potentially “ultra-hazardous” activity that should involve (as it has involved at
times in the past) some measure of strict personal liability. Although it is
debatable how much strict personal liability there should be, and for
whom, we strongly believe that at least some liability is necessary and
appropriate to curtail the excessive risk-taking that led to the crisis. The
people who need the most protection are not shareholders, or even creditors, but rather “the public”—a very expansive list including taxpayers
who have funded the bailouts, many other people who have suffered
from the financial crisis, and firms that were careful in controlling risk
but still lost money in transactions with firms that were not. Bankers
who profit enormously from their occupations in good times should be
prepared to share in the costs borne by the public when the risks they
take do not pan out. We should note, though, that the principal mechanism our proposal relies on is not an additional pot of funds from nowliable bankers available for payment to those damaged by a firm’s risktaking. Rather, we envision that the specter of liability would make them
more circumspect about risk, so that the damage would not arise in the
first instance, or would be far smaller.
A. Mandatory Joint Venture/Partnership Agreement
The first approach is a Joint Venture/Partnership Agreement
(JVPA) between a Covered Company, as defined below, and a Covered
Employee as defined below. The joint venture/partnership agreement
between the Covered Employee and the Covered Company would exist
regardless of the organizational form chosen by the company and the
liability rules that normally attach. Indeed, we anticipate that many, if
not most, Covered Companies would do business as limited liability entities; the proposed agreement would make some of their employees personally liable for some debts of those companies.
What companies would be Covered Companies? Covered Companies would include categories of companies for which it would be desirable, from a societal perspective, for highly paid executives to be personally responsible for company liabilities. The limited liability rule would
continue to shield executives of other companies whose organizational
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form provides limited liability. We initially propose for discussion purposes that the list of Covered Companies include most firms that are federally insured banks or bank holding companies; firms that originate,
buy, or sell mortgages; firms registered as broker-dealers or investment
advisors under the Securities Exchange Act; and at least the larger hedge
funds.
What employees would be Covered Employees? We propose that
an appropriate threshold amount would be $3 million (to be adjusted for
inflation) in annual compensation, where compensation is broadly defined to include, among other things, stock options and phantom stock.
Anti-abuse rules would be designed to deal with “creative” ways of
structuring compensation so as to avoid Covered Employee status. We
recognize that both employees in management positions whose job includes oversight of firm operations and employees (such as traders) who
are principally responsible only for their own work and do not have oversight responsibilities could be Covered Employees. The case for imposing liability on the first group is stronger, yet traders and other employees without oversight responsibilities can still have a substantial impact on a firm’s risk-taking. Making the second group personally liable
for the firm’s debts (as trader partners were in the old investment banking partnerships) is likely to make the firm’s approach decidedly more
conservative. For discussion purposes at least, we propose that the personal liability rule extend to all employees earning over the threshold
amount, whether or not those employees are technically corporate officers or managers.
What type of event would trigger personal liability of a Covered
Employee under the JVPA (the “Triggering Event”)? We mean to include only situations where the company cannot pay the amounts at issue; in this regard, a basic premise of the JVPA is that the Covered
Company itself should be primarily liable for its debts and the Covered
Employee should only stand in the position of a guarantor similar to that
of a general partner in a partnership. Thus, the Triggering Events would
include bankruptcy, receivership, and similar events, but not much else.
How long would a JVPA last? Our proposal would specify the beginning and ending dates of JVPAs. The beginning date is easy to specify: the time the employee became a Covered Employee. The ending date
is harder, as we want to include some period after the person ceased to be
a Covered Employee and indeed, even after the person ceased to be an
employee of the company at all. The premise is that a Covered Employee would likely have some responsibility for risks that lead to a
bank’s insolvency shortly after his departure and thus should have some
financial responsibility for the consequences. A starting proposal might
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be to extend the joint venture agreement for one year, although the
amount of personal liability could perhaps be phased down during that
year.
Which of a Covered Company’s liabilities would be covered by the
JVPA? The main liabilities we mean to cover are those a company
would incur because it has taken on financial risk. For example, many
contract liabilities to creditors would be covered, as would tort liabilities
under the securities laws, including underwriter liability and liabilities
for any type of fraud. 49 Most ordinary tort liabilities would not be covered; we see no policy reason why torts unrelated to the financial services business should render a Covered Employee liable. Nor would ordinary contract liabilities be covered if they are of the sort also incurred by
companies that are not Covered Companies, such as pension or health
care obligations to employees and retirees. In these contexts there is little policy rationale for differentiation between Covered Companies and
other companies.
Critically, we are not proposing unlimited liability. But what
should the limit be? How far should a Covered Employee’s liability extend? Which, and how much, of her assets should be available to her
firm’s creditors? We propose an exemption that would allow a Covered
Employee to designate $1 million in personal assets that would not be
subject to attachment by creditors of the Covered Company.50 We would
also exempt assets acquired in the future from reach by the Covered
Company’s creditors, saving Covered Employees from the humiliation
and expense of filing bankruptcy in order to protect future income.
We recognize, of course, that our proposal here is scarcely invulnerable to gaming. In particular, asset protection strategies would probably be developed by which Covered Employees would place their assets
out of reach. A more detailed exposition of our proposal will address

49. One objection should be anticipated: people may be liable for matters they had nothing to
do with. Our response is as follows: the vast bulk of people subject to our proposal will be highlevel managers. While such people may be specialized within the firm, they are senior enough in the
hierarchy that they are chargeable with the consequences of whatever happens to the firm. Their
bonuses may relate to overall firm results. In partnerships, a partner could not get out of liability by
pointing out that he had nothing to do with the activity which had generated liability. There may be
highly paid people who are not senior managers. While we recognize the objections to having them
be liable for something that happened someplace else in the firm, it is important to avoid the inquiry
into “whodunit.” Divisions with more clout may be able to attribute the mistake to other divisions
with less clout. If managers’ personal liability exposure motivates firms to shrink, we would consider this an additional benefit.
50. Our proposal would also include a higher amount of protected assets for older Covered
Employees because such employees would not have sufficient opportunity to rebuild their assets
after a firm failure. Otherwise, our proposal might be counterproductive if it encouraged older, more
experienced investment bankers to leave the field.
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such strategies.51 We should note, too, another mechanism by which our
proposal might be circumvented: senior management of a Covered Company could arrange a government bailout as an alternative to firm failure.52 Without proper safeguards, our proposal could even result in political pressure for bailouts that otherwise would not occur. Thus, for our
proposal to be effective and not just become a catalyst for yet more government bailouts, bailouts would have to be conditioned upon contribution by Covered Employees of the same capital amount they would have
been required to contribute had the firm failed.
B. Assessable Stock
Our second proposal also imposes liability on bankers if their firms
become insolvent. Bankers would receive part of their compensation in
the form of assessable stock;53 assessments would be made if their firms
became insolvent and additional funds were needed to pay the firms’
creditors. Assessable stock can thus be a significant exception to the limited liability rules that normally comes with the corporate form.
Assessable stock is not common today. Indeed, today the norm is
stock that is “fully-paid and non-assessable.”54 Such stock is deemed to
be fully paid for (even if the payment is services and the shares are part
of a compensation package with a generous salary and bonus) and cannot
be assessed. Lawyers starting practice in the last generation might be
excused for recounting the phrase “fully paid and non-assessable” by rote
whenever describing any stock to be issued, sold or pledged. In an earli51. In a more detailed exposition of our proposal, we will discuss fraudulent conveyance law
and other mechanisms by which such strategies would be derailed. We will also discuss whether
Covered Employees should be permitted to buy personal liability insurance or whether insurance
proceeds would instead have to be forfeited to the Covered Company’s estate. Many of these asset
protection strategies existed (and were sometimes used) in the days when investment banks operated
as general partnerships. To the extent that asset protection strategies were widespread, they may
have somewhat undermined the ethos of personal responsibility that comes with personal liability.
Still, however, the norm in partnerships is that every partner is expected to take responsibility for the
firm’s actions because every partner is personally liable. Responsibility and liability fall on a spectrum, and we seek to remove investment bankers from an extreme end of that spectrum where both
characteristics have been lacking. Asset protection strategies that cannot be derailed will affect the
efficacy of our proposal but will not recreate the world we have today in which there is little or no
personal liability for the consequences of risks that investment bankers take behind the corporate
shield.
52. For a discussion of the arbitrariness of government bailouts and the role of political influence of firm managers in obtaining bailouts, see Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts
of Interest and Ethics When Government Pays the Tab, (Minnesota Legal Studies, Research Paper
No. 09-37, 2009).
53. We are grateful for John Ellicott’s suggestion at this conference that we consider using
assessable stock and for his mention of experiences that his own family had in the 1930s holding
assessable stock in a failed bank.
54. See generally BAYLESS MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL (4th ed. 2002).
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er era, however, assessable stock was commonly used, particularly by
banks and other corporations that had large numbers of creditors and
sometimes urgently needed additional equity capital to survive.55 Generally, the assessment reflected that the stock had been sold at a discount—
it was intended to assure that shareholders finished paying for their stock
and did not simply walk away if the company’s fortunes declined. If the
company needed additional capital, consideration not paid for the stock,
usually up to its par value, could be assessed by a vote of the board of
directors.56
We propose that assessable stock would be the only permissible
medium that could be used to compensate any employee of a Covered
Company in excess of a certain amount; our starting proposal is to require compensation in excess of a certain amount, generally $1 million
annually, to be paid in the form of assessable stock.57 Compensation up
to this amount, but no more, could be paid in cash, non-assessable stock,
or other consideration; compensation over this amount could only be
paid in assessable stock. The amount would be adjusted for inflation; in
addition, we would provide that as employees became more senior, they
could receive steadily decreasing percentages of their compensation in
assessable stock.58 This would limit their incentive to change jobs frequently to avoid the accumulation of too much assessable stock (and too
much exposure to their firms’ downside risks).59 Employees would be
required to hold onto their assessable stock for some period (our initial
suggestion would be one year) after they left their firms.
How much could the assessment be? Our initial proposal is that it
be for the difference between the amount paid for the stock and the
stock’s fair market value (determined in some way we would specify) on
the date the stock was issued. The amount paid will typically be zero
since the stock will typically have been awarded as part of the banker’s
compensation package. If the company becomes insolvent, it seems appropriate that the banker’s services should be deemed to be inadequate
consideration for the stock, and the banker should be required to make up
the shortfall.
55. See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Under our proposal the assessable stock itself would have to be used; compensation in
options to buy assessable stock would not be allowed.
58. For instance, after working at a company for five years, an employee might be able to get
the higher of 25% of her annual compensation, or the amount in excess of $1 million in cash; after
10 years, the percentage might increase to 35%, and so on.
59. There is no need to define a “Covered Employee” for the assessable stock version of our
proposal because any employee receiving over $1 million (as adjusted as described in the text) in
compensation would be paid that excess amount in assessable stock. We do not propose making any
exceptions.
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For reasons similar to those discussed in the context of a JVPA, we
propose to exempt up to $1 million in personal assets from the assessment. Although assessable stock used in earlier years contained no such
exemption for stockholders of limited means, such an exemption avoids
the undue hardship which some families still remember from assessable
shares held by relatives during the Great Depression. For the reasons
explained above, making assets in excess of $1 million subject to the assessment probably imposes sufficient downside risk to encourage prudent management decisions by bankers who hold the stock. Recall in
this regard that our aim is not to create a pot of assets available to the
bank’s creditors, including for this purpose the public, but rather to put
the brakes on excessive risk-taking. Moreover, unlike with the JVPA
proposal, where we expect that the firm liabilities for which a banker
could be liable would almost certainly exceed his assets, with this proposal, the banker’s liability would be capped at the maximum amount of
the assessment, thus potentially letting him keep more than $1 million.
The incentives created by this version of our proposal are somewhat
different from those created by the proposed mandatory JVPA. The
mandatory JVPA is an on-off switch that turns on when a Covered Employee earns over $3 million per year. The assessable shares gradually
phase in personal liability depending on the amount of accumulated annual compensation over $1 million per year. The longer an employee
has been with the company accumulating stock, the more personal liability exposure that employee has. The most senior employees are likely
to pay the most, although some less senior employees who have been
with the company accumulating stock for a long time would pay a lot as
well.
Assessable stock is a less severe measure than the JVPA, which potentially imposes (almost) unlimited liability. Assessable stock would
impose some degree of personal liability on a senior employee in circumstances where the harsher measure of imposing a JVPA relationship
would not be justified. However, it could be extended to more employees: employees earning less than $3 million could be required to accept some of their compensation in assessable stock. This proposal
might be more palatable to policy makers than the JVPA. They might be
more willing to require that compensation over a certain amount only be
in assessable stock than to support an erosion of limited liability; historically, the reaction to erosions of limited liability have been strongly negative among important constituencies.60

60. For example, corporate directors and officers and their insurers were swift to react even to
a gross negligence standard being imposed on them. See CHARLES O’KELLEY & ROBERT
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Since assessable stock would in most cases expose fewer of a manager’s assets to potential seizure, it would not be as effective a risk deterrent as the JVPA. But it may prove more feasible than the JVPA. In any
event, it is a step in the right direction. That being said, we should mention a potential downside of our proposal. To limit their liability, employees might leave their jobs and sell their assessable stock. We think,
however, that the effect on turnover need not be too significant an issue,
for several reasons. First, we would restrict employees’ ability to sell
their assessable stock upon departure from their firms. Furthermore, under our proposal, as an employee continued her employment at the same
firm, steadily decreasing portions of her compensation would be paid in
assessable stock. The rate at which employees would accumulate assessable stock would decrease, as would the growth of their commensurate
liability. Finally, that employees have significant human capital invested
in their firms should limit their inclinations to terminate their employment.
VII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSALS AND OUR
RESPONSES
We can anticipate several objections to our proposals. We set forth
these objections below and our responses. First, if the U.S. were to adopt
our proposals or something like them, U.S. investment banks and other
Covered Companies might find it difficult to attract employees. They
might lose some employees to foreign competitors; they might even
move their legal domiciles outside of the U.S. to avoid application of the
law.
We think that this objection is somewhat overblown. Wall Street’s
competitive position is raised as an objection to virtually every regulatory proposal in the financial arena, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002, as well as proposals now being considered in response to the latest
failure of unregulated financial markets. The objection is that Wall
Street will not be able to get the best employees if it is constrained in
how much it can pay them, or if it has to offer worse terms than the employees might get elsewhere. But many people are willing to pay significant amounts to live or work in particular places. For instance, New
York has much higher taxes than Connecticut, yet many people (indeed,
many people who would be subject to our proposal) who could commute
to New York from Connecticut live in New York. The sorts of people
who would be subject to our proposal may be willing to assume the risks
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 320–
324 (5th ed. 2006).
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of some personal liability in order to enjoy the financial and other benefits from being able to ply their trade in their country of choice.
Still, we recognize that part of our proposal would have to include
considerable buy-in by many desirable jurisdictions. The employees we
are concerned with cannot too easily be able to move to an otherwise
comparable jurisdiction that has limited liability. The buy-in could consist of jurisdictions’ adoption of some version of personal liability, or
perhaps an outright restriction on high compensation. And the jurisdictions at issue would have to impose their rules based on the presence of
sufficient personnel, transactions or assets—not “formal legal domicile,”
lest firms all evade the rules by becoming domiciled in the Cayman Islands.
Second, employees at Covered Companies might seek higher pay to
compensate for the added risk they would be facing, fueling an upward
spiral in compensation. This is a serious objection as well; we can only
hope that the forces now set in motion to limit compensation, including
outrage and the desire to pre-empt regulation, will serve as a limiting
force. If it does not, we might have to look to increased regulation of
pay, as undesirable an option as that may be.
Third, personal liability could drive many experienced people, especially those who have acquired significant assets, out of the investment
banking business. Banking might suffer as a result. The old investment
banking partnerships did not seem to have this problem; still, we do not
want to assume it away. We have two responses: first, as the new set of
rules becomes the norm, the specter of personal liability should loom less
prominently in motivating departures from the investment banking business. Moreover, we are not proposing to leave bankers penniless: we do
allow them to keep enough for a comfortable retirement.61
Fourth, investment bankers might try to evade personal liability
through insurance or other contractual arrangements. They could ask for
a “firm failure” rider to director and officers’ insurance. Although they
cannot themselves legally short their company’s stock to hedge against
firm failure, they can encourage family members to do so.62 Some of
these strategies could be regulated––for example, by providing that
proceeds from firm-failure liability insurance contracts would be assets
subject to attachment by firm creditors —but some would probably avoid
61. Partnerships of old did not offer this type of asset protection; however, limited asset protection is not inconsistent with our intent to impose enough downside on highly paid investment bankers to discourage excessive risk. The threat of genuine poverty might have popular appeal but is not
required. Relative poverty should suffice.
62. This of course assumes they do not have inside information; if they do, encouraging family
members to exploit such information would be illegal.
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regulation. The old investment banking partnerships also saw their share
of contractual arrangements that shielded partners from firm debts: family trust funds sometimes served this purpose, and Goldman Sachs, which
did not become a corporation until 1999, did some of its business
through limited liability entities controlled by the partnership. Indeed,
the old investment banking partnerships themselves had insurance; insofar as the partners were liable for the partnerships’ debts, the insurance
covered the partners as well, paying out before the partners would have
to give creditors access to their own assets. But insurance cannot realistically cover the kind of catastrophic losses potentially at issue.63 Thus,
if some form of our proposals were adopted, even partners of firms with
high insurance coverage would be mindful of potential personal liability.
In some situations the insurer itself might be insolvent, as was the case
with AIG. Our proposal addresses this situation by including within the
definition of Covered Company insurance companies that transact with
large financial institutions; such companies’ most highly paid executives
would be Covered Employees.
We do not seek to eliminate every avenue by which an employee’s
personal assets could be protected if his firm fails. As we have noted,
our proposal is mainly intended to work by influencing those making
decisions about risk within their firms. It is only secondarily intended to
make a pot of assets available for recovery by a firm’s creditors, especially since the assets available to be seized are likely to be a small portion of the firm’s debt. Our proposal would require a sufficient number
of the top decision-makers at a sufficient number of firms to have enough
of their financial well-being on the line to make a difference in the risks
they take with other people’s money. The direction in which the herd of
investment bankers is headed should change with exposure to personal
liability; excessive risk takers will stand out from the herd instead of
leading everyone else over the precipice.
We should note another related objection: that with clever structuring, an employee or company could manage to avoid applicability of a
law adopting our proposal. A Covered Company could function with
very few employees, and contractual arrangements by which it obtained
the other services it needed from companies that were not Covered Companies. We think such structuring is clearly possible, but we also think it
would be limited, such that most intended targets of the regime would be
covered.

63. Insurers may have arguments against having to pay, but that is beyond the scope of our
article.
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Finally, personal liability may discourage some financial innovation. This is a genuine concern. But—to overstate our position for a
moment—in the financial services area, perhaps we have had enough
innovation for the time being. We do not need more new products that
investors do not understand, particularly when so many investors are institutions run by bankers who respond not by shunning unfamiliar products but instead by succumbing to a herd mentality of doing whatever
other investors do. 64 Innovations scarcely warrant the favorable connotation that term carries in an atmosphere where investors—many playing
with money that is not their own—refuse, at least ex ante, to admit that
they do not understand them.65
We are in good company with our less-than-ringing endorsement of
financial innovation. Paul Volcker was quoted in an interview in the
Wall Street Journal as follows:
We hear about these wonderful innovations in the financial markets,
and they sure as hell need a lot of innovation. I can tell you of
two—credit-default swaps and collateralized debt obligations—
which took us right to the brink of disaster. Were they wonderful
innovations that we want to create more of?
You want boards of directors to be informed about all of these innovative new products and to understand them, but I do not know
what boards of directors you are talking about. I have been on
boards of directors, and the chance that they are going to understand
these products that you are dishing out, or that you are going to
want to explain it to them, quite frankly, is nil.
I mean: Wake up, gentlemen. I can only say that your response is
inadequate. I wish that somebody would give me some shred of
neutral evidence about the relationship between financial innovation
recently and the growth of the economy, just one shred of information [sic].66

64. See Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand A (Much Larger) Lemons
Premium, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS (forthcoming) (discussing the role herding played in investor
behavior in the present financial crisis).
65. It should be noted that ex post, they have been quick to make this admission.
66. Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704825504574586330960597134.html.
For a
measured defense of innovation, see Robert Litan, In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation, THE BROOKINGS INST., Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers
/2010/0217_financial_innovation_litan.aspx. Litan concludes that “there has been more socially
useful financial innovation over the past several decades . . . .” Id. at 47. He talks about how such
innovations could be encouraged. But his is not a blanket endorsement of innovation. He concludes
that “we should stand readier to correct abuses when they appear and not let destructive financial
innovations wreak the kind of economic havoc we have unfortunately just witnessed.” Id.
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To state our position more moderately, we think financial innovation is overrated and can be quite perilous. In other fields, such as the
development of pharmaceuticals, we are quite willing to tolerate rules
and policies that may interfere with innovation. To the claim that in the
pharmaceuticals field the stakes are higher, the current crisis is evidence
enough that financial snake oil also has an enormous social cost. Our
response here is also our response to a related objection: that our proposal would make financial executives too risk-averse.67 There is such a
thing as too little risk-taking; there is also such a thing as too much risktaking, and we are very much suffering the result of the latter. Just as the
benefits of financial innovation have been a reflexive mantra for some
time, so have the costs of too little risk taking in general. There is no
principled way to determine the ideal level of risk-taking; our proposal
simply reflects our view that we have apparently swung in the direction
of encouraging too much of it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our proposals are intended to spur debate on a significant problem:
what to do when market actors have the incentive and ability to take excessive risks that can impose significant costs on the entire society. We
appreciate the logistical and political hurdles that would confront an effort to re-impose personal liability on investment bankers. The regulation would deal with a notoriously porous part of the market, in which
structuring to circumvent rules is a much-practiced (and lauded) craft.
Moreover, we are suggesting a strict liability regime for executives who
may have done nothing wrong. Strict liability can at times be unfair, just
as the unlimited liability of general partnership law can be unfair. Imposing liability for failed investment banks exclusively on creditors or on
society as a whole, however, is even less fair. The present regime is
deeply flawed: we think the present financial crisis shows how necessary
it is to at least start a vigorous debate on the subject and consider a radical proposal, a return to the past. We can only hope that what Adolf
Berle said in 1932 is true today: “[T]he public is in a mood to impose on
[the corporate system] a steadily growing degree of responsibility for our
economic welfare.”68

67. This is, of course, a familiar objection—one made to justify very deferential review of
business decisions.
68. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at viii.

